This paper investigates the interaction between endogenous fertility behav ior and the distribution of income and wealth among families in a competitive market economy. We construct a growth model in which altruistic dynasties are heterogeneous in their initial stocks of physical capital. Dynasties make choices of family size along with decisions about consumption and intergenerational trans fers. We show that, if the degree of altruism per child is decreasing in the number of children and if preferences over the number of children satisfy a normality as sumption, all steady states are characterized by equality of capital stocks and consumption among families. We also show that specific fu nctional forms for the utility function used in the fertility literature, including Becker and Barro (1988) , Barro and Becker (1989) , Benhabib and Nishimura (1993) and Lucas (2002) , are special cases of the preference specifi cation used in this paper. Hence, they also generate egalitarian steady states. Este artigo investiga a interagao entre fecundidade end6gena e a distribui<;ao de reoda e riqueza entre famHias em uma economia competitiva. Construlmos Urn modela de crescimento em que dinastias altruistas sao heterogeneas nos seus estoques iniciais de capital fisico. Dinastias fazem escolhas sobre 0 tamanho da familia, assim como sobre 0 consumo e transferencias intergeracionais. Nos rnostramas que, 5e 0 grau de aitruismo por filho for decrescente no numero de filhos e 5e preferencias sobre 0 mlmero de filhas satisfizerem uma hip6tese de normalidade, todos as estados estacionarios serae caracterizados por igualdade dos estoques de capital e consumo entre famHias. Tambem mastrarnos que farmas fu ncionais especfficas para a fun<.;ao de utilidade utilizadas na literatura, incluindo Becker e Barro (1988) , Barro e Becker (1989), Benhabib e Nishimura (1993) e Lucas (2002), sao casos especiais da especifica<.;ao de preferencias empregada neste artigo. Portanto, elas tambem geram estados estacionarios igualihirios.
Introduction.
This paper investigates the interaction between endogenous fer tility behavior and the distribution of income and wealth in a com petitive market economy. Specifically, we examine under which con ditions endogenous fertility leads to equality of income and wealth among families in the long run.
We consider a society divided into a finite number of dynasties, in which individuals from different generations are altruistically linked. All the members of a given dynasty have the same physical capital holdings, but dynasties differ in their per capita holdings and in their size (number of members). Different dynasties interact in competi tive markets for goods and factor services in each period. Parents are assumed to derive utility from their consumption, number of children and the well-being of each child.
We show that, if the degree of altruism per child is decrea.'ling in the number of children and if preferences over the number of children satisfy a normality assumption, all steady states are characterized by equality of capital stocks and consumption among families. We also provide sufficient conditions for uniqueness of the steady state.
The result that all steady states are egalitarian is established in Becker and Barro (1988) for a particular functional form of prefer ences over the number of children. The main contribution of this paper is the generalization of the Becker-Barra model and the char acterization of the assumptions about preferences and technology that are sufficient to generate equality of the long-run distribution of income and wealth in a competitive market economy.
We also show that other functional forms for the utility function used in the fertility literature, including Barro and Becker (1989) , Benhabib and Nishimura (1993 ) and Lucas (2002) , are also special cases of the preference specification used in this paper. Hence, they also generate egalitarian steady states.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and defines a recursive competitive equilibrium for the economy. Sec tion 3 defines a steady state and an egalitarian steady state and provides sufficient conditions for uniqueness of an egalitarian steady state. Section 4 analyzes a special case in which preferences over the number of children satisfy the Becker and Barro (1988) specification and the technology is of the Cobb-Douglas type. Section 5 concludes.
The Model.
The model is set up as follows. Society is divided into a finite number of dynasties. We define a dynasty or family line as a col lection of agents composed of a parent and all her descendants. We assume that the economy starts out with a finite number of par ents, who in turn define a finite number of dynasties, indexed by i= 1, ... ,M.
Agents live two periods, the first as children, in which they do not make any economic decisions, and the second as parents. Each period is taken to be a generation. Parents are assumed to value their consumption, the number of children they have, and the lifetime utility of each child, according to preferences given by!:
where Ct denotes parental consumption, nt denotes the number of children, Ut is the utility of the parent and Ut+l is the utility of each child. We assume that W is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave in all its arguments, twice continuously differ entiable, and satisfies the following discounting condition:
We also assume that lim We = +00 and lim W n = +00.
Ct_O n t-+O
Parents have identical preferences and supply inelastically one unit of labor. All the currently alive members of a given dynasty have the same stock of physical capital but dynasties differ in their per capita physical capital holdings. Moreover, dynasties may differ in size (number of members).
There is a large number of fi rms endowed with the same con stant returns to scale technology, so we can assume, without loss of generality, that there is only one firm, which produces the only con sumption good according to an aggregate constant returns to scale production function, described by Y = F(K,N),where K and N denote aggregate capital and labor, respectively.
l Recursive (but not necessarily time-additive) preferences over consumption have been used by Lucas and Stokey (1984) and Dolmas (1996) in the context of optimal growth models. The formulation presented in the text has been postulated by Alvarez (1999) and Lucas (2 002) in the context of endogenous fertility models. Let y and k denote output per capita and capital per capita, respectively. We assume that y = f(k) F(k, 1) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions2• In each period, firms sell goods to the household sector and agents supply their labor at a wage rate w and rent their capital to firms at a rental rate r. The economy is assumed to be competi tive, so both agents and firms take prices as given.
In this economy, agents are indexed by the dynasty to which they belong. Let ki denote the capital stock of a member of dynasty i and Ni the number of members of dynasty i. A typical member of dynasty i derives his income from the wage rate wand from capital ki, which earns rent at the rate r. Capital depreciates at the rate o.
We assume that each child has a fixed cost if; in units of the consump tion good, so if;ni is the total cost of child-rearing. Parents choose a bequest k; for each child, so total bequests equal nik;. Parents also spend their resources on their own consumption Ci, so their budget constraint can be written as3: 
Competition and profit maximization by firms together imply that factors are paid their marginal products and firms earn zero profits. These conditions define the functions r(S)=r (k,a)=f' (�aiki ) 
2) b, nand c are optimal decision rules, that is, they solve (1), for given h. 3) the law of motion h satisfies the following rational expectations condition:
Instead of characterizing the recursive competitive equilibrium defined above, we will focus instead on steady state equilibria. 
In a steady state, the rental rate of capital and the wage rate will be constant at rand w, respectively, since the economy-wide per capita capital stock, k* = Z=� 1 a i ki, is constant.
Remark 1. Let V( ki, s*) denote the lifetime utility attained by an adult member of dynasty i in a steady state. Since the dis tribution of capital and population shares is constant in a steady state, the optimum value function of a parent depends upon s* only through k*, the economy-wide per capita capital stock'. Hence, we can define a function
Consider the decision problem of the head of dynasty i when the economy is at a steady state.
satisfies the following functional equation:
where R -1-(j + r = 1-(j + f l Ck) and w = f(k) -kfl(k)6. The first-order conditions corresponding to this problem are:
Equation (7) equates the marginal cost of an additional unit of bequest to its marginal benefit. Notice that the marginal utility of consumption in the left-hand side of (7) is multiplied by the fertility rate, because of the interaction between bequests and the number of children in the budget constraint.
Equation ( 8) equates the marginal utility of children to its marginal cost. Notice that the bequest per child k; increases the marginal cost of children, again because of the interaction between quantity and quality of children in the budget constraint.
The envelope condition is:
Let Ui = v(ki). From (6)- (9) and the definition of a steady state, we can characterize the steady state with the following system of equations:
6 Henceforth, I will drop the superscript * that has been used to denote steady state values, in order to simplify the notation.
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Equations (13)- (17) imply:
( 18) i=l Assumption 1. The utility function W : R� -t R is defined by W(c, n, u) = W(c, n) + <p(n)u. The function W : R� -t R is continuous, twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave7 in (c, n), and satisfies lim We = +00 and lim W n = c-+O n-JoO +00. The function <p : R+ -> R+ is continuous, strictly increasing, 7 All the results in this paper could also be obtained if we assumed that W is quasi"concave, twice continuously differentiable, and satisfies <p(0) = 0, 0 < <p < 1, 0< <p' < 1, and <pI! < 0 for all n > 0 as well as lim<p'(n) = +00. n�O The term <p( n) converts the utility of children into that of par ents, and can be interpreted as measuring the degree of altruism of parents towards children. Assumption 1 implies that <p(n)/n is strictly decreasing in n, that is, <p -<p'n> O. This corresponds to the assumption that the degree of altruism per child is decreasing in the number of children.
In order to gain some intuition on the implications of this hy pothesis, we can use the preference specification defined in Assump tion 1 and rewrite (11) as
)..
This condition shows that the steady state degree of altruism per child, <P�A), may be interpreted as an "effective discount factor" , in the sense that it is the factor at which families effectively discount the future.
The assumption of decreasing altruism per child means that the total degree of altruism increases with the number of children at a decreasing rate. This assumption seems reasonable, for at least two reasons'. First, it implies that, for a given level of utility per child U, parental utility is strictly concave in n9• Second, it is important to notice that this assumption is satis fied if <p(n) = fl, 0 < fl < 1, which corresponds to the standard 8 As will be discussed in section 4, the functional forms for the utility fu nction most widely used in the fertility literature incorporate this assumption.
9If children do not yield utility directly through the function W, the assumption of decreasing altruism per child is not only sufficient but also necessary so that concavity of the utility function in n is obtained.
assumption that the discount factor is constant. This shows that the assumption of decreasing altruism per child is less restrictive than it seems.
Assumption 2. The production function f : R+ --+ � is continuous, twice continuously differentiable, and satisfies flO) = 0, l' > 0, and 1" < 0 for all k > 0 as well as lim1'(k) = +00 and
In order to solve for the steady state, we will use the following strategy. First, we will postulate an economy-wide capital stock per capita k. From (14) and (15), we can express the interest rate R and the wage rate w as functions of k:
Using (10)-(13), we will solve for Gi, k; , 14 and..\ for a given pair (R, w). Using (19) and (20), we will define a mapping from k to the individual capital stock ki' ki = lJ!(k). Then we will use (16) and (17) to solve for the equilibrium k.
Consider a member of a dynasty i. Given the preference struc ture assumed above, (10) becomes
From (21) and using the discounting assumption 0 < <p(n) < 1, we can solve for U i as a function of (c, ..\) :
The derivatives of 9 have the signs above because of the assump tions that W is strictly increasing in C and .>-and '1" ('>-) ;::: : O.
After substituting (22) into the left-hand side of (12) and us ing the functional form for W from assumption 1, we can write the steady state marginal rate of substitution between children and con sumption as a function of steady state consumption and fertility as follows:
From (13), we can write k; as a function of C; and .>-(for given R and w) :
If we substitute (23) and (24) into (12), we obtain
Given the assumed preference structure, (11) can be rewritten as:
Since <P�A) is strictly decreasing in .>-, we can solve (26) for .>-as a function of R, .>-= �(R), where �(R) satisfies: 
Differentiating (27) implicitly with respect to R, we obtain
If we use (27) to substitute for >. in (25), we obtain:
We want to find restrictions on W such that (28) defines Ci as a function of (R, w), where W is defined in assumption 1. Throughout this analysis, we will keep (R, w) constant and view both sides of (28) as functions of c;. 
Assumption 3 imposes a lower bound on the cost of child-rearing cf;, given by ���� . One way to interpret this assumption is that it requires the net cost of producing a descendant to be positive. An additional child costs cf; in the current period, which is worth Rcf; next period. Since an additional descendant will earn w next period, when she becomes an adult, the net cost of an additional adult is cf;R -w, which is positive from assumption 3. Lemma 1 states that, in any steady state, Ci = Cj Vi, j = 1, ... , M .
Lemma 1. Let assumptions 1-4 hold. Then there is at most one Ci that solves (28) for given (R, w) .
Proof: See Appendix.
Let [l(Ci,),) = m (�:'A) as defined in the Appendix. The derivative of [l (Ci, ),) with respect to Ci can be related to the aggregator W as follows:
where all derivatives are evaluated at steady state values. As shown in the Appendix, assumption 4 implies that [l c 2: 0, which guarantees that a unique Ci solves (28).
To gain some intuition on the restriction imposed on c( Ci,),), consider the following problem":
where I is income. In this problem, k ' is held constant, so u = v( k ') is a parameter'2.
l lThe following argument is motivated by a similar reasoning in Lucas (2 002).
1 2This problem is a version of the problem stated in (6), with bequests per child k' taken as given.
Definition 4. n is normal if the maximizing value of n in (30) is increasing in I for all values of ¢ and k'. This is equivalent to the condition We We n -(W n + <p ' g) Wee :::: 0 1 3 .
Definition 5. nand u are complements if the maximizing value of n in (30) is increasing in u for all values of ¢ and k'. This is equivalent to the condition We<p' :::: 0'4.
If we assume that n is normal and n and u are complements in the sense defined above, the first term in the numerator of (29) will be positive at the steady state solution, since ge > O. Yet, these conditions are not enough to guarantee that n e :::: 0 and hence the existence of a unique Ci satisfying (28), since the second term in the numerator of (29) is also positive. Hence, we need the stronger condition c (Ci, A) :::: l.
The intuition for this result is the following. Richer dynasties desire to have more children, since children are a normal good. Yet, they also face a higher price of children, because they invest more in each child. Hence, it might be possible to have a steady state in which two dynasties with different capital stocks and consumption find it optimal to have the same number of children.
In order to have an egalitarian steady state, we need a stronger normality assumption, described by Assumption 4. This normality assumption implies that fertility increases with income even after the negative effect due to the quantity-quality tradeoff is accounted for15 • In light of Lemma 1, we can define Ci as a function of (R, w) , Ci = 7r(R, w) . The following proposition states that all steady states are egalitarian.
Proposition 1. Let assumptions 1-4 hold. Then all steady states are egalitarian, that is, they satisfy ki = kj Vi, j = 1, ... ,M.
Intuitively, the implication that all steady states are egalitarian follows from the assumptions that fertility increases with income and that larger families discount more the utility of each child. It should be noted, however, that assumptions 1-4 only establish suffi cient conditions for all steady states to be egalitarian.
We consider next the issue of uniqueness of the steady state.
From (19) and (26), we can define A as a function of k, A = �(R(k)) -A(k), where A(k) satisfies:
Differentiating (31) implicitly with respect to k, we obtain:
Equation (32) states that when the economy-wide capital stock per capita is higher, the fertility rate is lower. The reason is that a higher k reduces the interest rate, so fertility has to be lower in order to reduce the effective rate of time preference.
From (19), (20) and equation (AI) in the Appendix, we can
define Ci as a function of k, Ci = C(k), where C(k) satisfies:
Becker and Lewis (1973).
Definition 6. c is normal if the maximizing value of c in (30) is increasing in I for all values of ¢ and k'. This is equivalent to the condition (Wn + <p' g)Wcn -W c (Wnn + <pI/g) 2: 0 '6.
Lemma 2. Let assumptions 1-5 hold. Then C (k) is strictly decreasing in k.
The intuition for this result is the following. A higher k is as sociated with lower fertility, which raises the marginal rate of sub stitution between number of children and consumption, from the assumption that c is normal. The normality condition on fertility re quires that consumption decline. A change in k also affects the cost of fertility through changes in w and R. By using the fact that, in equilibrium, R and w are related to marginal productivities, we can observe that the net (negative) effect of an increase in the wage rate on the cost of child-rearing dominates, which reduces consumption further. 
Since ki = kj Vi,j = 1, ... , M, (16), (17) and (34) imply that the steady state economy-wide capital stock per capita k must satisfy the following condition:
Equation ( Proof. See Appendix.
Becker-Barro Preferences'7.
Let W(c, n, u) = c" + ( 3n1-cu 0 < ( 3 < 1 0 < e < 1 0
For this specification of preferences, the altruism function is given by <p(n) = (3n1-c. It is straightforward to verify that assump tion 1 is satisfied. In particular, \O� n ) = ! is strictly decreasing in n. In order for 0 < <p(n) = (3n1-c < 1, it is necessary that , o < n < (�) =. In order for 0 < <p'(n) = (1 -e)(3n-c < 1, it , is necessary that n > [(3(1 -e)F. These conditions imply that n 17 These preferences have been studied in Becker and Barro ( 1 988 ) , Barro and Becker (1989) ([ ,8 ( 1 -c:) 
It is also clear that assumption 2 is satisfied.
In this example, the function g(Ci, A), which gives the steady state lifetime utility Ui as a function of steady state consumption and fertility, is given by:
The steady state marginal rate of substitution between number of children and consumption is given by:
Substituting (36) into (37), we obtain m(G, A), which gives the steady state marginal rate of substitution between children and con sumption as a function of steady state consumption and fertility:
which is strictly increasing in G. For the Becker-Barro preferences, the function n(Ci, A) m ( �: , ).) is given by
which does not depend on G. From (38), we have C:(Ci, A) _ mc(Ci, ).) Ci = l.
The comments of an anonymous referee were helpful to clarify the implications of Assumption 1 for the Becker-Barro preferences.
Hence, assumption 4 is satisfied. We have to verify which restric tion on 1> is imposed by assumption 3. The maximum sustainable level of the economy-wide capital stock per capita, k, satisfies
This implies 1> > ( 1 ;;; ,, ) A l':a. Assumption 5 amounts to W nn = -£,13(1 -£)A-(1+o) g < 0, which holds in this case since ,13 > 0 and O<£<l.
Hence, assumptions 1-5 are satisfied for the Becker-Barro pref erences. From propositions 1 and 2, it follows that, for this combi nation of preferences and technology, there exists at most one steady state and it is necessarily egalitarian.
We can calculate the egalitarian steady state as a function of factor prices by solving the subsystem (10)-(13). Solving (11) for the Becker-Barro preferences, we obtain
Equation (40) gives the steady state fertility rate for a given R. Substituting (40) into (38), we obtain
(1 -£)e; m(e;,A) = O"(R -A) Substituting the expression above into (25) and solving for e;,
Equation (41) gives the steady state per capita consumption for given (R,w). It is clear from (41) that all families have the same steady state consumption. Substituting (19) with D = 1 and i'(k) = aAk<>-l into (40), we have
Differentiating (42) with respect to k, we obtain
Since ,6 > 0, A > 0, c > 0 and 0 < a < 1, it follows that >.. ' (k) < 0, as obtained in the general model presented in section 3 (equation (32)). Substituting (19) withD = 1 and (20) into (41) and using the Cobb-Douglas specification for the production function, we obtain
Differentiating (44) with respect to k, we have
( 4 5) Since 0 < a "< 1 and ¢ > Ii = (1;.;<» k Yk, we obtain from (45) that G'(k) < 0, as in the general model presented in section 3. Substituting (43) and (45) into equation (A14) in the Appendix and using the Cobb-Douglas specification for the production function, we obtain that W'(k) < 0, as in section 3, which establishes the uniqueness of the steady state.
The result that all steady states are egalitarian for the Becker Barro preferences is established in Becker and Barro (1988) . The result on uniqueness of the steady state is proved in a different way in Barro and Becker (1989) , in the context of a neoclassical growth model with exogenous technological progress.
By characterizing the Becker-Barro preferences as special cases of the preference specification used in this paper, we have shown which are the assumptions on preferences and technology that are crucial to generate the implications in Becker and Barro (1988) and Barro and Becker (1989) about uniqueness and equality of steady states.
It is straightforward to observe that other functional forms for the utility function used recently in the fertility literature, including Benhabib and Nishimura (1993) and Lucas (2002) , are also special cases of the preference specification used in this paper'9. Hence, they also generate egalitarian steady states.
Conclusion.
In this paper, we constructed a growth model in which altruistic dynasties are heterogeneous in their initial stocks of physical capi ta!. Parents make choices of family size along with decisions about 19 Benhabib and Nishimura (1993) use the utility function W{c,n,u)=cCT +cp{n)u and Lucas consumption and intergenerational transfers. We showed that, if the degree of altruism per child is decreasing in the number of children and preferences satisfy a normality assumption, then all families have the same stock of physical capital per capita in the long run. More over, this common level of the capital stock is unique.
We also showed that specific functional forms for the utility func tion used recently in the fertility literature, including Becker and Barro (1988) , Barro and Becker (1989) , Benhabib and Nishimura (1993) and Lucas (2002) , are special cases of the preference specifi cation used in this paper.
The main contribution of this paper is to characterize which are the assumptions about preferences and technology that are cap tured by the specific functional forms used in the fertility literature and which are sufficient to generate uniqueness and equality of the long-run distribution of income and wealth in a competitive market economy.
Even though the contribution of the paper is theoretical, it has some empirical implications which we intend to address in future re search. Specifically, in the model presented in this paper the equality of wealth and income among families in the long run is due to the fact that fertility increases with income and that larger families dis count more the utility of each child. The model thus suggests that, to the extent that families derive their income from physical capital, the number of children tends to increase with income and fertility is an equalizing force.
Several other studies have shown, however, that if families are heterogeneous in their human capital stocks, the number of children tends to decline with income and fertility behavior tends to generate long-run inequality20. The reason is that human capital increases the opportunity cost of child-rearing, and thus has a negative substitu tion effect on fertility. This implies that families with higher stocks of human capital have smaller families and discount less the utility of each child.
A few empirical studies have documented a positive correlation between family income and fertility". However, most of the empir ical studies find a negative correlation between fertility and family income22• The studies that find a positive relation between fertil ity and income usually control for variables that are related to the productivity of the household in the marketplace, especially wages and the level of education. When these variables are not controlled for, a negative relation between fertility and family income is usually observed.
However, there is some empirical evidence of important nonlin earities in the relationship between fertility and income. In particu lar, some studies have documented a U-shaped relationship between fertility and income23• The model presented in this paper suggests that the observed positive relationship between fertility and income for rich families may reflect the fact that income from physical capital is an important income source for this group2'. Moreover, the model predicts that, in this case, fertility would be an equalizing force for rich families.
One topic of future research that we intend to explore is the and Doepke (2002).
2 1 See Becker (1960), Simon (1974) , Wahl (1985) and Schultz (1997) .
22 See Mincer (1963), Willis (1973) , Mulligan (1993) empirical evaluation of these implications of the model. Another interesting possibility would be to analyze whether differences in in come composition between poor and rich families may account for the observed nonlinearities in the empirical relationship between fer tility and income, and to derive the associated implications for the distribution of income in the long run.
Appendix.

A.I. Proof of Lemma
If we divide both sides of (28) by Ci and rearrange the terms, we obtain:
From assumption 1 and assumption 3, the right-hand side of (AI) is strictly decreasing in Ci.
Differentiating n (Ci, �(R)), with respect to Ci we obtain:
From assumption 4 and (A2), n (ci,�(R)) is weakly increasing in Ci at the steady state solution, so the left-hand side of (AI) is weakly increasing in Ci at any such solution. Since the right-hand side of (AI) is strictly decreasing in Ci, there exists at most one Ci satisfying (AI). 0 A.2. Proof that Definition 4 is equivalent to the condi tion We We n -(W n + <p I g) Wee :2: o.
The first-order conditions associated with (30) are given by
where we express the optimal solutions for c and n as functions of I. Differentiating (A3) with respect to I and using matrix notation, we obtain (A4)
where
Solving (A4) for �] using Cramer's Rule, we obtain
From the second-order conditions, we have det(A) > O. From (A3) and (A5), we have where we used the fact that u = 9 (c, n) . This establishes the condi tion in the text. 0
A.3. Proof that Definition 5 is equivalent to the condi tion Weep' 2': O.
where we express the optimal solutions for c and n as functions of u. Differentiating (A6 ) with respect to u and using matrix notation, we obtain Solving (A7 ) for �� using Cramer's Rule, we obtain
Since det(A) > 0 and We > 0, we obtain from (AS) :
which establishes the condition in the text. 0
A.4. Proof of Proposition 1 (A7) (AS)
From Lemma 1, in any steady state we can define Ci = 7r (R, w) and A = �(R). From (24), we obtain: The denominator of (AI3) is positive, since n c 2': 0 (which fol lows from assumption 4), ¢ -r > 0 (which is equivalent to assump tion 3) and <p E (0,1), which follows from assumption 1. The term nn in the numerator is the derivative of 0, with respect to n, evaluated at A, which is equal to: which is negative from assumption 5. From the feasibility condition (18), we have f(k) + (1 -8)k > c;. Since e > 0 and < pI > 0, the term inside brackets in the numerator of (AI3) is strictly positive. Since RI(k) = f"(k) < 0, we have established that GI(k) < o. 0 A.7. Proof of Proposition 2.
If we view both sides of (35) Since C'(k) < 0 from (A13), A'(k) < 0 from (32) and 1 -8 + f'(k) -A = R(l-cp ) > 0, from assumption 1, we obtain that the function w(k) has a negative slope when it crosses the 45-degree line, which implies that it can cross it only once, establishing the desired result. 
